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Benjamin Dugan entered a conditional of guilty to the charge of injuring jails 
under Idaho Code § 1 18. . Dugan his right to challenge the district 
Memorandum Decision denying Dugan's Motion to Dismiss. Mr. Dugan 
that the district court in denying his motion to dismiss the injuring jails 
as his alleged conduct did not constitute damage to a jailor "place of 
confinement" and, thus, his conduct did not amount to injuring jails. 
On December 5, 2011, Mr. Dugan was leaving the courtroom after a hearing on a 
grand theft by possession of stolen property charge. (1/5/12 Tr., p.7, Ls.7-8; 
Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.g.) Mr. Dugan was angry 
regarding the recent proceedings in court and as he was leaving court, he stepped into 
the jury room and tipped over chairs. (1/5/12 Tr., p.10, Ls.20-22, p.22, L.19 - p.23, L.2.) 
He also banged his head into the hallway walls as he exited the courthouse. (1/5/12 
Tr., p.1i, Ls.i9-22, p.23, Ls.3-9.) Mr. Dugan was to be transported from the Blaine 
county Courthouse back to the Blaine County Detention Center in one of the Blaine 
County patrol vehicles, a 2006 Dodge Durango. 1 (1/5/12 Tr., p.8, Ls.14-2D.) After 
being placed in the patrol vehicle, Mr. Dugan began kicking and head butting the doors 
and the rear surfaces of the rear compartment area of the vehicle. (1/5/12 Tr., p.12, 
L.i8 - 13, L.9; R., p.i D.) Mr. Dugan was in belly chains and shackle restraints at the 
1 The Dodge Durango had previously been used as a patrol vehicle but, at the time of 
this incident, was being used only for transporting persons to and from the Blaine 
County Jail. (1/5/12 Tr., p.23, Ls.15-22; 4/3/12 Tr., p.?, Ls.2-8.) 
1 
time, still to inflict damage to of vehicle. Cl/5/1 
charged Mr. Dugan with injuring in violation of I § 1 
preliminary was during the deputy 
to his (1/5/12 Tr., p p.25, L.10.) 
After the deputy's testimony, counsel for Mr. should 
dismissed I.C. § 18-7018 does not apply to Mr. Dugan's a 
patrol vehicle is not a "place of confinement." (5/1/12 Tr., Ls.9-11.) The 
concern that it was not familiar with the history of the 
statute, but nonetheless found that the had met its burden of proof. (1/5/12 
Tr., p.23, 15.) The magistrate judge found probable cause to bind 
Mr. Dugan over into the district court. (1/5/12 Tr. p.32, 16-19.) The State then filed 
an Information again alleging that Mr. Dugan had committed the crime of injuring jails 
by, "willfully and intentionally break[ing] down and or destroy[ing] and/or injur[ing] a 
place of confinement, to-wit: the interior of Blaine County Sheriff jail transport vehicle 
SD713, a 2006 Dodge Durango." (R, pp.22-23.) 
Counsel for Mr. Dugan filed a Motion to Dismiss and Brief in Support of 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. (R, pp.33-42.) During the hearing on the Motion to 
Dismiss, counsel for Mr. Dugan argued, inter alia, that the language of I.C. § 18-7018 
was plain and unambiguous and that the term "place of confinement" could not be 
interpreted to include an implement of transportation, even a patrol vehicle that was 
2 As the costs to repair the damaged vehicle was estimated to be $1,174.31, the 
conduct could have been charged as a violation of I.C. § 18-7001, felony malicious 
injury to property, which also has a maximum penalty of five years in the custody of the 
Idaho Department of Correction. (R, p.10.) 
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to transport prisoners to and from County jail; that, 
alternatively, under the rule of lenity, the court should construe the narrowly and 
find that the allegations in Mr. Dugan's case did not constitute injuring jails as described 
by (4/31'12, p. L.2 p.9, L.1 R., pp.33-36.) 
After hearing arguments of counsel, the district the under 
(4/3/12 Tr., p.18, Ls.1 Later, the written 
decision denying Mr. Dugan's motion to dismiss, finding the evidence was sufficient 
to show Mr. Dugan injured or damaged a "place of confinement" when damaged 
interior doors of patrol vehicle. (R., pp. 1.) In analysis, the 
first examined the plain, ordinary meaning of the term "place of confinement": 
Black's Dictionary defines confinement as, "[t]he act of imprisoning or 
restraining someone; the state of being imprisoned or restrained." (9th 
2009). Webster's Dictionary contains twelve definitions for "place." The 
most relevant definitions include, "physical environment, a way for 
admission or transit, physical surroundings; an indefinite region or 
expanse, a building or locality used for a special purpose, the three-
dimensional compass of a material object; a particular region, center of 
population, or location, a building, part of a building, or area occupied as a 
home; an available seat or accommodation, an empty or vacated 
position." MERRIAM-WEBSTER (2012). 
court 
(R., p.56.) The district court did not analyze the import of the above definitions in 
determining the plain, ordinary meaning of the term, but instead turned to a decision by 
the Utah Court of Appeals, Utah v. Burgess-Beynon, 99 P.3d 383 (Ut. Ct. App. 2004), 
remarking: 
The sole issue on appeal in Burgess-Beynon, was whether "other place of 
confinement" under Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-418 included police vehicles. 
The Utah statute is nearly identical to the Idaho statute, stating, "[a] 
person who willfully and intentionally breaks down, pulls down, destroys, 
floods, or otherwise damages any public jailor other place of confinement, 
including a detention, shelter, or secure confinement facility for juveniles, 
is guilty of a felony of the third degree." As in Idaho, the Utah court 
remarked that they had previously not interpreted the "other place of 
3 
confinement" portion of their Utah court determined that 
was nothing in the statute limiting "other place of confinement" to 
something like a jail, prison or other penal facility, as the defendant had 
argued. This Court finds the same lack of limiting language in this Idaho 
This Court must find had the 
confinement" mean "correctional 
"correctional facility" lieu of "other 
7018. 
intended of 
" it would just 
of confinement," in I 
The defendant argues that the argument is dependent on the 
physical presence of the defendant. This argument presumes that if the 
defendant were in a hospital, the would then argue the hospital is a 
place of confinement and, therefore, any damage committed by the 
defendant would be Injury to a Jail. This Court disagrees with this line of 
logic for two reasons. First, in Baxter v. 149 Idaho 859, 863, 
3d 675 (Ct. App. 2010), the Court "[w]e do not read I.C. § 18~ 
7018 as limiting the statute to include harm to only the physical structure. 
Instead, Idaho's statute is all inclusive and incorporates injury to any jailor 
other place of confinement including its operational and maintenance 
equipment." Id. at 864. Clearly a hospital is not operational or 
maintenance equipment of a jail. Second, when in a hospital or other 
place not intended to designed for confinement, a defendant is shackled 
and guarded, precisely because the facility is not a place of confinement. 
However, a vehicle used by the Sheriff's Office to transport defendants to 
and from the jail to court or other correctional facilities is clearly designed 
and intended for confinement and is also operational or maintenance 
equipment of the jail. 
(R., pp.56-58.) 
The district court denied the motion to dismiss, finding that I.C. § 18-7018 was 
not ambiguous, and that the term "other place of confinement" meant a physical 
environment or surrounding that is intended to imprison or restrain someone. 
(R., pp.53-61.) Mr. Dugan entered a conditional guilty plea to the charge of injury to 
jails, preserving his right to challenge the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss 
4 
on (R., pp.74, 87.) The district Mr. Alforcf' plea and 
ordered a substance abuse evaluation and a (Tr. 4/19/12, p. L.25 p.55, L.8.) 
The district court imposed a withheld judgment, and placed Mr. Dugan on probation for 
a of five , pp.73-81, 62-69; Tr. 6/14/12, p.1 Ls.11~16.) Mr. Dugan 
timely of Appeal. (R., pp.84-86.) 
3 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) ("An individual accused of crime may 
voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison 
sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the acts 
constituting the crime.") 
5 
err by denying Motion to Dismiss a patrol 






information 'Jv"J~~ upon the failure of the 
in denying 
to 
motion to dismiss 
probable cause 
for every element of the offense. Specifically, the State failed to establish that 
Mr. Dugan damaged a "place of confinement" within the meaning of I.C. § 18-7018. 
Mr. Dugan was charged with injury to jails he damaged patrol vehicle while 
he was being transported back the Blaine County jail. Although was 
cause to believe that Mr. Dugan was the individual who inflicted damage, there is no 
evidence that he committed the crime of injuring jails, as defined in I.C. § 18-7018, 
because a patrol vehicle is not a "place of confinement" within the meaning of the 
statute. 
B. Standard Of Review 
When reviewing a finding of probable cause, this Court defers to the findings of 
fact of the lower court that are supported by substantial evidence, but this Court reviews 
de novo whether those facts as found constitute probable cause. State v. Martinez-
Gonzalez, 152 Idaho 775,778 (Ct. App. 2012). 
In addition, this Court reviews the application and construction of statutes de 
novo. State v. Ephraim, 152 Idaho 176, 177 (Ct. App. 2011). In doing so, this Court is 
obligated to give effect to every word and phrase within the statute, to avoid a 
construction that would render any portion of the statute a nullity, and to further avoid 
treating any of the terms within the statute as mere surplusage. See, e.g., Bradbury v. 
7 
Idaho Judicial Council, 149 Idaho 107, 116 (2009); Ephraim, 152 at 1 State v. 
1 Idaho 502, 505 (Ct. App. 2003). 
C. 
was insufficient a of probable cause for the 
of injuring jails under I.C. § '18-701 At a preliminary hearing, state is 
required to 
LC.R. 1(b). 
evidence "upon material element of the offense charged." 
State presents its theory of the charge, both through argument and 
by the complaint filed, and then the examines the charge from the state, 
along with the evidence presented, to determine whether "a public has been 
committed and [if] there is probable or sufficient cause to believe that the defendant 
committed such offense." I.C.R. 5.1 (b); State v. McLellan, 154 Idaho 77, 294 P.3d 
303, 305 (Ct. App. 2013). Further, although the magistrate is entitled to rely on the 
theory and argument set forth by the State, there is no requirement that the magistrate 
search the record and the law to find alternate theories of the case for the State to 
proceed under. McLellan, at _, 294 P.3d at 305. "The duty to proffer theories of a 
case under which the state wishes to proceed rests solely with the state, as it 
possesses the power to bring and subsequently seek to amend and prosecute 
charges." Id. 
The State alleged that Mr. Dugan committed injury to a jail, where Mr. Dugan 
kicked and head butted the door panels of a Blaine County patrol vehicle. In this case, 
the State-in both its initial criminal complaint and its Information-charged Mr. Dugan 
with felony injuring jails pursuant to I.C. § 18-7018. (R., pp.6-7, 22-23.) The relevant 
portion of this statutory provision provides that: 
8 
Every person who wilfully [sic] and intentionally down, pulls down 
or otherwise destroys or injures any public jailor other place of 
confinement, is punishable by fine not exceeding $10,000, and by 
imprisonment in the state prison not exceeding five years. 
Idaho § 18-70'18. 
damage to a patrol vehicle injury to jailor other 
under I.C. § '18-7018 previously considered 
of 
any 
published opinion in Idaho and, therefore, to an first impression.4 
Construction and application of purely legal questions, and therefore 
courts exercise review. McGee v. J.D. Lumber, 1 Idaho 
(2000); Ivlitchell v. Bingham, 130 Idaho (1 "The language of statute has to 
be plain, obvious, and rational meaning." State v. Bumight, 1 Idaho 654, 
659 (1999). "Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, th[e] court 
must give effect to the statute as written, without engaging in statutory 
construction." State v. Beard, 135 Idaho 641, 646 (Ct. App. 2001). 
Mr. Dugan does not contest that he damaged the door panels of the patrol 
vehicle. What Mr. Dugan does challenge is the district court's conclusion that the patrol 
vehicle was a "place of confinement" such that probable cause existed to find that 
Mr. Dugan violated I.C. § 18-7018. 
1. The Plain Language Of I.C. § 18-7018 Is Not Ambiguous 
The State failed to show that Mr. Dugan damaged a "place of confinement" when 
he kicked and head butted the door panels of the patrol vehicle. Although Idaho 
4 As the district court noted in its Memorandum, State v. Magill, 119 Idaho 218 (Ct. App. 
1991), was a case in which the district court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss 
the charge of injuring jails where it was alleged that the defendant caused damage to a 
police car; however, this issue was never taken up by the Court of Appeals, as the State 
as dismissed that charge as part of a plea agreement. (R., p.56.) 
9 
§ 18~7018 does define "place of confinement," the language of must 
plain, obvious, and rational meaning. The plain, obvious, rational meaning 
of of confinement" is a location that houses prisoners, a jailor 
facility. This meaning is with the other Idaho 
" the or a "confinement 
I.C § 1 12 providing that committed must be of 
confinement"), .C. § 20-242 (statute detailing requirements of a furlough, including 
penalties for failing to return to the "place of confinement"); I § (statute 
providing that court may order person confined in county or municipal jailor other 
"confinement facility"). 
This meaning is consistent with the definitions used in other jurisdictions. 
e.g., United v. Parks, 620 F.3d 911, 914 (8th Cir. 2010) (Missouri Revised 
Statutes 556.061 (21) defining "place of confinement" as "any building or facility and the 
grounds thereof wherein a court is legally authorized to order that a person charged with 
or convicted of a crime be held."); Stephens v. Cent. Office Review Comm. of New York 
State Oep't of Carr. SeNs., 255 A.D.2d 845, 846, 683 N.Y.S.2d 137, 138 (1998) (N.Y. 
Correct. Law § 158 (McKinney) providing that "[t]he commissioner may designate as a 
place of confinement of a prisoner any available, suitable and appropriate correctional 
5 The definition of "correctional facility," contained in I.C. § 18-101A, is instructive: 
(1) "Correctional facility" means a facility for the confinement of prisoners 
or juvenile offenders. The term shall be construed to include 
references to terms including, but not limited to, "prison," "state prison," 
"state penitentiary," "governmental detention facility," "penal institution 
(facility)," "correctional institution," "juvenile correctional center," "Idaho 
security medical program," "detention institution (facility)," "juvenile 
detention center (facility)," "county jail," "jail," "private prison (facility)," 
"private correctional facility," or those facilities that detain juvenile 
offenders pursuant to a contract with the Idaho department of juvenile 
corrections. 
10 
institution or facility whether maintained by the city, or federal government and 
may time transfer a prisoner from one place of confinement to another."). 
Here, the district court examined the plain, ordinary meaning the 
"confinement": 
Black's defines "[t]he of imprisoning or 
restraining sorneone; the of being imprisoned or restrained." (9th 
2009). Webster's Dictionary contains twelve definitions for "place." 
most relevant definitions include, "physical environment, a way for 
admission or transit, physical surroundings; an indefinite region or 
expanse, a building or locality used for a special purpose, the 
dimensional compass of a rnaterial object; a particular region, center 
population, or location, a building, part of building, or area occupied as 
home; an available seat or accommodation, an empty or 
position." MERRIAM-WEBSTER (201 
,p.56.) Based on the above meanings of "place," the most prevalent meaning of the 
term is a building; however, the district court did not analyze the import the above 
definitions on deterrnining the plain, ordinary rneaning of the language, but instead 
relied on a decision by the Utah Court of Appeals, Utah v. Burgess-Beynon, 99 3d 
383 (Ut. App. 2004). 
The Burgess-Beynon decision is not controlling authority and the Utah court's 
decision in Burgess-Beynon is limited to that court's interpretation of the intent of its 
legislature. 
A reviewing Court merely interprets a statute, beginning with its plain language, 
and it is for the legislature, not the judiciary, to determine whether a statute is socially 
unwise or should be amended. Verska v. St. Alphosus Regional Medical Center, 151 
Idaho 8S9, S93 (2011) (quoting In re Estate of Miller, 143 Idaho 556, 567 (2006)). For 
example, where the legislature itself provides a statement of purpose that is not 
specifically enacted into law, the statement of purpose has no legal effect. Id. at S92-
893. '''The asserted purpose for enacting the legislation cannot modify its plain 
11 
", Id. (quoting Viking Constr., Inc. v. Hayden Lake Irr. Dist., 149 Idaho 187, 
191 (2010)). By extension, the judiciary is not interpret a 
more than contained , no matter how broadly the Court 
legislature the statute to 151 Idaho 
is no basis for this Court conclude the legislature 
meaning of confinement" to those 
or prisoners are lodged, upon belief or assumption that the 
legislature meant the to be interpreted broadly. There is simply no support in 
Idaho law for the district court's conclusion that "place of confinement" can be a 
method of transportation, such that a patrol car would constitute a "place of 
confinement. " 
In concluding that the State met its burden of proof, the district court erroneously 
relied on the Idaho Court of Appeals' language from Baxter v. State, 149 Idaho 859 
(Ct. App. 2010). In its Memorandum, the district court relied on Baxter. 
First, in Baxter v. State, 149 Idaho 859, 863, 243 P.3d 675 (Ct. App. 
2010), the Court stated, "[w]e do not read I.C. § 18-7018 as limiting the 
statute to include harm to only the physical structure. Instead, Idaho's 
statute is a/l inclusive and incorporates injury to any jail or other place of 
confinement including its operational and maintenance equipment." Id. at 
864. Clearly a hospital is not operational or maintenance equipment of a 
jail. 
(R., p.58.) Here, the district court erroneously extended the holding in Baxter to include 
a patrol vehicle within the meaning of operational or maintenance equipment of a jail. 
(R., pp.53-61.) However, in Baxter, the Idaho Court of Appeals found that a telephone 
was part of the operational equipment of the jail, even though it was not owned by the 
jail. Baxter, 149 Idaho at 864. The Court listed communication devices and video 
surveillance equipment as examples of equipment items present in modern jail facilities. 
12 
lel Further, Court noted that the telephone was to wall of 
jail, it was therefore connected to the actual physical structure of the jail through wiring 
such that it could classified as a jail fixture. Id. n.1. A telephone attached to 
wall is a fixture, the operational or equipment of a jail 
a is not. vehicle is not equipment or 
a jail. It is an item to transport persons housed inside jail to the 
courthouse, but it is not part of the physical structure a jail, nor is it contained within 
the walls of the jail, nor is it even a fixture of the jail. 
in this case is whether probable cause find Mr. Dugan 
committed injury to jails under I. § "18-7018, due to damage done to patrol car. 
Because the finding of probable cause must be oa~,ea upon "substantial evidence" of 
"every material element of the offense charged," and the State did not establish that a 
patrol vehicle is a jailor "place of confinement," in that the plain meaning of the phrase 
"place of confinement" does not include a patrol vehicle, the district court erred in 
denying Mr. Dugan's motion to dismiss. See LC.R. 5.1 (b). 
2. To The Extent There Is An Ambiguity Within The Statute, The Legislative 
Intent Was Clearly Not To Include Patrol Vehicles Within The Meaning Of 
"Place Of Confinement" 
Although the Idaho statute punishing conduct for those who injure a jail in Idaho 
has undergone several repeals and re-codifications since the time I.C. § 18-7018 was 
originally enacted in 1864, the language is virtually unchanged since 1864.6 
6 In 1864, § 147 provided as follows: 
If any person shall, wilfully [sic] and intentionally break down, pull down or 
otherwise destroy, injure, in whole or in part, any public jail or other place 
of confinement, every person so offending shall, on conviction, be fined in 
any sum not exceeding ten thousand dollars, nor less than the value of the 
13 
of lengthy during which law included a 
we must look the legislature may have 
when it enacting 
area in which they were being , At 
"injuring legislature not possibly 
to include a the case cars not 
available in 1887, the on the law was 7 Thus the 
did not intend to include a vehicle within meaning of of 
the time legislation enacted, in 1864, 
3, 
Lenity, It Must Be Interpreted In Favor Of Mr. DU9£!] 
If this Court finds that I.C, § 18-'7018 is ambiguous with regard to the "place of 
confinement" language, the rule of lenity requires that it be construed in favor of 
Mr, Dugan. Where the statute is not ambiguous, the appellate court is to give effect to 
the plain meanings of the terms in the statute. Verska v, St. A!phonsus Reg'! Med. Ctr., 
151 Idaho 889, 895-96 (2011). However, should the Court find that the statute is 
ambiguous, the rule of lenity requires that ambiguity to be resolved in Mr. Dugan's favor. 
See, e.g., State v. Anderson, 145 Idaho 99, 103 (2008). "It is well-settled that criminal 
statutes are to be construed strictly and in favor of the defendant." State v. McCoy, 128 
Idaho 362, 365 (1996). "[AJmbiguity concerning the ambit of crimina! statutes should be 
said jail or other place of confinement so destroyed or of such injury as 
may have been done thereto by such unlawful act, and be imprisoned in 
the territorial prison for any term not exceeding five years, nor less than 
one year. 
7 The first automobiles built for sale to the public in the United States were made in 
1893. http://en.wikipedia.org/wikilHistory_oCthe_automobile 
14 
in favor of lenity." United v. 
(quoting Rewis v. United 401 U 
936 (9th 
808, 811 (1971)). The United 
1991) 
Court spoke to the cannons for interpreting an ambiguous statute in v. 
U.S. 1 (1990). 
in determining the we look not only to the 
statutory language, but to of the statute as a whole 
object and policy. the governing standard is 
forth in a criminal it is to apply the rule of lenity in 
resolving any ambiguity in the ambit of the statute's coverage. To the 
that the language or history is uncertain, this "time-honored 
interpretive guideline" serves to ensure both that there is fair warning of 
boundaries of criminal conduct and the legislatures, not define 
inal liability. 
Id. 1 001 ~1 002. As is acknowledged above, criminal statutes are promulgated on the 
prem they give notice to society regarding the bounds the law, one of the 
quintessential requirements of due process of law. Inherent in the concept of fair 
warning and due process, the general public cannot be on notice of what might have 
been the legislature's intent or policy behind drafting a statute. 
The rule of lenity requires that in the interest of justice and to protect Mr. Dugan's 
due process rights, this Court should refrain from ascertaining the possible intent of the 
legislature or the policies it might have had in mind in enacting the statute. Accordingly 
as is articulated herein, in order to show that Mr. Dugan committed injuring jails within 
the meaning of I.e. § 18-7018, the State was required to show that Mr. Dugan damaged 
a "place of confinement." Under this interpretation of the statute, the State offered 
insufficient evidence to convict Mr. Dugan of felony injuring jails, and the district court's 
order denying his motion to dismiss should be reversed. 
15 
Mr. Dugan respectfully requests that this Court reverse 
Motion to Dismiss and his conviction. 
this 8th of May, 201 
Deputy State Appellate Public 
16 
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